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The Frustrations of Family Violence Social Work:
An Historical Critique
LINDA GORDON

University of Wisconsin/Madison
Department of History

Contrary to the view that social work has been characterizedby substantial shifts in treatment methods over the last hundred years, an
historical study of case records from child protection agencies in Boston, 1880 to 1960, revealed very little improvement or change in the
social-work response to family violence cases. The continuity in socialwork response rested, at its best, on workers' common-sense apprehension of the complex (intrapsychic, relational, and environmental)
causes of family violence, and, at worst, on several constricting ideologies about properfamily life: gender assumptions that made women's
domesticity and mothering essential; and a public/private dichotomy
which assumed that the stable family must be economically selfsupporting.

Family violence has been identified as a social problem in
the United States (US) for approximately 110 years. It came as
a surprise to me, therefore, in the course of an historical study
of family violence, to find very little change in the responses of
social workers to family violence problems, and no evidence of
success in controlling this problem (Gordon, 1988). Sampling 80
years of case records from three Boston child welfare agencies,
including the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (MSPCC), from 1880 to 1960,1 I found little
change in the professional treatment of family violence. Moreover, the continuity was largely one of ineffectiveness-inability
to prevent or ameliorate family violence.
These findings contrast with histories of social work which
have identified major shifts in its casework practice (Robinson,
1930; Woodroofe, 1962). Shifting diagnostic paradigms certainly
affected the definitions of family violence (Gordon, 1988), but
did not make much difference in its treatment. A major reason
for the difference between these and previous findings is meth-
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odological. Previous histories were based on social work conpolicy
textbooks,
and
public
ference
proceedings,
pronouncements-what historians call prescriptive sources,
statements of how casework ought to be done. This study was,
by contrast, the first historical work to be based on case records,
2
evidence of what was done.
Lack of progress in the handling of family violence cases was
not the result of incompetent, lazy, or unfeeling social workers,
nor of poor training. Indeed, the case records indicated very
little change after the professionalization of social work and the
spread of formal training requirements. Rather I argue here that
social workers were (and still are) constrained from helping family violence victims by a set of "instructions" they received about
proper family life-that it must rest on economic independence
and proper gender relations. Given such instructions, social
workers were, at worst, blinded to the roots of violence in precisely such ideal families and, at best, double-binded by the
conflict between what they heard from clients and the prescriptions of their background, culture, and training. This paper looks
at the changing historical manifestations of these constraints and
how they affected diagnosis and treatment of family violence.
After an introductory identification of the ideology of proper
family life which undergirded social work, the article looks at,
first, the nineteenth century punitive orientation of "charities
and corrections"; second, the contributions of casework; and
third, the influence of psychology upon family-violence social
work.
Family Violence and the Proper Family
The arguments here are based on the reading of thousands
of case records. But to illustrate how views of proper family life
inevitably impinged on treatment of family violence, a single
case history will serve better than many statistics. This case was
not chosen because it was particularly explicit or clear; indeed
its ambiguity and the obscurity of many of the clues will seem
familiar to many family case workers. The episodic quality of
its narrative, and the vast areas of missing information, are typical, as is its complexity (which I have considerably simplified
in what follows); virtually every family violence case occurred
in a "multi-problem" family.

Family Violence

1919: Jack and Mary Jones (not their real names) were southern Black migrants to Boston. Jack earned a meager, sporadic
living as a waiter. Mary, seven months pregnant with her fourth
child, took the three children and ran off. Jack came to the Massachusetts SPCC for help in reclaiming her. She was traced to
a confinement hospital and the couple was "reconciled"; there
is no evidence of inquiry into Mary's reasons for leaving.
1921: Mary herself came to the MSPCC "desiring to obtain
elderly woman to come into her home and care for the chn. as
[she] had to go out and do day work [domestic service]....
[The case worker] made it quite evident to [the mother] that the
desirable thing was for her to stay at home and care for the chn.
and have fa obtain a steady position." There is no evidence of
inquiry into the source of Mrs. Jones' decision to work for a
living.
1924: A hospital social service worker called the MSPCC: the
second-born child, Mabel, was hospitalized with "tuberculosis
of the spine"; the other children appeared weak and undernourished, possibly tubercular; Mary was pregnant with her
seventh; the hospital considers this a case of child neglect. Released from the hospital, Mabel was supposed to be kept in a
"Bradford frame" to correct curvature of her spine. A few months
later the MSPCC visitor reported that the free milk the family
was receiving had been discontinued because they were uncooperative in keeping Mabel in the frame. "The family are
clever enough to pretend to cooperate ... and then they do as
they please. They consult neighbors and friends . . .The income
of the family is not sufficient for the chn. to have good nourishment. It is a policy of the [agency] not to supplement wages."
1925: The MSPCC worker, trying to find an institutional
placement for Mabel, had her examined at the Boston Psychopathic hospital (a vanguard in psychological testing) which found
her to be "definitely sub-normal, 3 but the Drs. thought there
was considerable room for improvement if she were under the
right environment. Because of her mental condition, she cannot
be accepted at Canton. She cannot go to Peabody House because
she is colored. She could go to Baldwinville if $5.50 could be
paid each week ... [but] The State will not pay ..."
1930: Mary Jones, now expecting her eleventh child, approached a priest at the Catholic Charities organization to com-
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plain of her husband's sexual abuse of their daughters. Out of
the house working, hoping to earn enough to buy their home,
she was unable to supervise, she said.
On 1-5-30 Magdalene was supposed to menstruate but did
not.... Finally Magdalene told mo. that fa. had had relations with
her. Fa. acknowledged to mo. that he had been with both Magdalene and Leona. He had told them that he wd. kill them if they
said anything. He also told mo ....

that he wd. blow her head off

if she went to the Pol[ice] or any Soc[iety] and he agreed never to
bother them any more but he did not keep to his promise. He had
also bothered Sylvia and Genevieve. Fa. claimed that what he did
to the chn. did not hurt them ....

About a mon. ago fa. joined

the Shiloh Baptist Ch. and she though that he wd. be all right...
she had not wanted to report to the pol. because of her large fam.
and because she was about to become a mo. [But 7 months later]
Magdalene told her that fa. was still using her and that he had
continued to bother the girls. . . . In Dr. Lovell's presence Sylvia
[said] that fa.... had had her use her mouth on him . .. had told

her that he wd. knock her teeth down her throat if she ever told.
Genevieve told . .'. that fa. had had her use her mouth on him
Mo. said she often
and had told her he wd. lick her if she told ....

wondered why chn. were retarded in sch. and thought that this
might have something to do with it as he has used Magdalene and
Leona since they were about 6 yrs. old [i.e. for nine years].
This is not a case of abuse made invisible by household
privacy; both members of the Jones marriage approached the
MSPCC for help, leaving a record trailing over nine years. Mary
turned to the agency despite having been thwarted by its intervention only three years previously, an indication of the intensity
of her need. Nor were the social workers unresponsive: they
found Mary Jones in 1921 when she ran away, tried to solve
medical problems in 1924, tried to find a placement for a crippled child in 1925. They did not discover the continuing pattern
of abuse because they did not ask the right questions. They did
not ask why Mary Jones was so desperate as to run away while
seven months pregnant and burdened with three children; they
did not ask why she felt it so important to try to develop her
own earning power. Although they knew that economic aid might
have contributed substantially to the Jones family's relationships,
they were frustrated by the relief policies of other agencies: the
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use of relief as a reward for proper behavior, as in cutting off
the children's milk as punishment for Mary's failure to confine
her daughter in an orthopedic frame, or in the policy of not
supplementing wages.
The family violence case workers I met were not normally
uncaring. Rather they faced the problem of family violence with
inadequate tools. Indeed, the lack of progress in "treating" family violence is a result, not of the underdevelopment of the science of social work, but, in part, of its very development. As
professionalization separated social work from reform activism,
particularly from feminist influence (Austin, 1985; Ehrenreich,
1985; Chambers, 1986), the process promised to free social
workers from value-laden judgements; in fact it continued the
domination of conventional family values, albeit these were
sometimes hidden in specialized diagnostic paradigms. These
values can be described, briefly, in two categories: gender arrangements and private-public dichotomies.
First, family social workers have been oriented to uphold a
particular sexual division of labor that has been normative for
family life since approximately the eighteenth century (Abramowitz, 1985; McIntosh, 1979). This division assigns women
the responsibility for child raising and for the emotional and
social well-being of the entire family, regardless of their other
responsibilities. It assigns men the responsibility for breadwinning regardless of their other burdens. It maintains the fiction
of the family wage-the norm that men should earn enough
single-handedly to support a family-despite the fact that the
majority of men-and the vast majority of working-class mennever earned such a wage; most families were dependent on
women's and children's wage labor to survive. The contradiction
between ideology and reality in several areas, but especially
with regard to the family wage, escalated family conflict, while
social workers' guidelines for desirable family life discouraged
them from supporting creative solutions. This is the reason for
the obtuse nonresponse the caseworker made to Mary Jones'
request for a babysitter. In family violence cases this commitment to upholding the conventional sexual division of labor
made social workers unsympathetic to women's desire for independence from men, unlikely to look for reasonable motives
therein (such as escape from abuse); it equally made social
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workers unsympathetic to the pressures on men unable to provide adequately for their families.
Second, social workers operated within the constraints of
the modern norm of private, nuclear-family child raising and
child support. In this system, families are expected to be financially independent; to require help from outside the nuclear family-whether from relatives, charities, or the state-was perceived
as deviant and undesirable. The picture of proper family life
based on this and the family-wage assumption is and was
counter-factual. Today only a small minority (11% in 1984) of
American families actually conform to this pattern; most American children will live in single-mother families at some time in
their lives. In the family violence cases in my study, only 50%
had fathers even as the main, let alone only, contributor to the
family income; 17% were mainly supported by mothers, 12%
mainly by charities or "welfare," the remainder by an assortment of relatives and children. Just as today the 89% who depend on women's earnings and/or public funds are treated as
aberrant, defective, or even pathological. In the family violence
cases the casework goal was usually to restore dependence on
the father, with little evaluation of the realism of that goal and
even less of the potential disadvantages of such dependence for
mothers and children.
When these two norms-male breadwinning and family independence-were combined, they could create a trap for family
violence victims. Mary Jones was probably trapped in her incestuous household by her fear that on her own she could not
keep her children. Mary Jones had several times sought economic and physical independence from her husband, and caseworkers had been unable to help. When Jack was finally
prosecuted, caseworkers condemned Mary for not protecting her
daughters and argued that she must have known about the incest
all along. I think so too. But I also suspect that she knew it
would not help to go to the police-because of her economic
dependence. The events after he was sentenced to 5-10 years
proved her absolutely right: Mary Jones asked poor law authorities for aid to make the mortgage payments on her house, and
they refused, admitting also that they did not see how she could
afford to rent a tenement sufficient for her large family, recom-
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mending instead that the children be adjudged neglected and
placed out. The incest perpetrator was caught and punished,
but hardly more than his victims. Indeed, this punishing of
victims was the most common result in family violence cases
(Gordon, 1985 and 1988), because of the refusal to accept that
public support of familial child-raising ought to be normal and
not merely exceptional.
Nineteenth Century Moralism and Punishment
Although these two norms have remained dominant for
nearly two centuries, their expression has changed considerably,
adapting to new understandings of poverty and family pathology. In the application of social-work diagnoses, and the treatment preferences that flowed from them, there were three major
shifts in the last century: moralism and criminal prosecution in
the nineteenth century; casework in the Progressive era; and
psychology in the last half century.
Child protection agencies arose in the 1870s throughout the
western world; by the end of the decade there were SPCCs in
15 countries and more than half the states in the US. These
agencies had a double ancestry-in charity work and in the
citizens' law-enforcement activity of the Societies for Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals (SPCAs). But it was the latter orientation
that dominated (Antler & Antler, 1979), and the SPCCs exploited
existing laws as well as lobbying for-in many states, virtually
dictating-new laws. These made it easier to get court orders to
remove children from their parents and increased the prosecution of parents for abuse (Pleck, 1987). For example, the MSPCC
secured legislation in 1882 allowing a probate court judge to
appoint the agency as guardian for any ill-treated child under
14; given the great influence of the MSPCC in the courts it effectively gained the power to remove children immediately,
without trial, from their parents. Although private, the child
protection agencies became virtually an arm of the state, due to
their arrogation of police powers, by the end of the 1880s.
Child protectors were aware of the limitations of punitive
policies, because of the lack of alternatives to private family child
raising, and women's economic dependence. After immediate
removal of children from their homes, two forms of legal action
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were available: severing parental custody permanently, by having the children legally declared neglected, and prosecuting assailants under criminal statutes. Both resulted in the punishment
of victims. Children taken from their parents were most often
placed in worse situations: under-funded prison-like institutions, where fatal epidemics raged and harsh physical punishment was common; unsupervised foster homes where parents
were motivated largely by the desire for children's labor and
where additional cases of child abuse emerged. Massachusetts
was a progressive state in attempting to remedy these abusesfor example, it pioneered in paying foster parents and attempting to supervise them-but its efforts were always inadequate.
Prosecution of assailants had equally devastating effects on victims. Most of those prosecuted were men, 4 leaving women unable to support their children. The results were usually
impoverishment and, again, surrender of children to institutions.
Because prosecution of the assailants was so hard on the
victims, the latter often opposed it. Women refused to cooperate
in pressing charges against men; those who did so out of temporary rage were often forced to change their minds quickly.
There were many petitions for pardon of male abusers by desperate wives (Gordon, 1988). One 1894 case was typical: a woman
prosecuted her husband for battery and he was sentenced to a
year in jail, but two months later she petitioned for his pardon
because she was forced to live with her stepfather who was also
abusive. 5 Women and children were reluctant to cooperate with
child protectors because they understood that while their abusers might be punished, they would get no help.
Early in the twentieth century child protectors grew attracted
to the rhetoric of preventive and nonpunitive social work. Many
SPCCs and Humane Societies enthusiastically joined the casework-oriented national child welfare establishment. The MSPCC
led the way in condemning the old punitive orientation, particularly after the appointment of C. C. Carstens as its chief in
1907, and the previous historians of child protection, reading
the new rhetoric, assumed that the transformation was substantial (Antler & Antler, 1979).6 But the evidence from case records
suggests that it was minimal.
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Casework
Casework virtually redefined family violence. Previously the
problem had been conceived as cruelty to children, a concept
directing attention to willfully violent assailants and innocent
victims, not focused on the family. Indeed, the early child protectors also took up some extrafamilial forms of child abuse,
such as school punishment and child labor. The casework approach to child protection established the family as the unit of
analysis (the MSPCC's definition of a "case" united all the problems of one family in a single folder) and the source of problems.
This was not an inevitable result of the casework method in
itself; on the contrary, casework was originally conceived, by
Mary Richmond for example, as serving purposes of reform as
well as treatment, investigation of the entire environment.
But casework procedure became increasingly adapted to a
medical model, identifying pathology in the client (Conrad and
Schneider, 1980, pp. 161-171). Its goal was to reconcile family
members and to restore family harmony and stability. Casework
continued to include societal factors in diagnoses of family violence, but it assumed exclusive family responsibility for these
7
problems (Levine and Levine, 1970; Holbrook, 1983).
Casework may have actually narrowed the range of help offered to clients. 8 The environmentalist diagnoses did not lead
child protectors to lobby for subsidized housing, arrange babysitting or campaign for day nurseries, disability compensation, and public medical care. Nor were they able to offer
treatment for the family pathologies they identified. In visiting
homes where there had been allegations of family violence,
workers could offer sympathy and encouragement, particularly
to women who were themselves victims, and these expressions
of support were often received positively. In relation to adults
who were assailants, and in attempting to protect children, the
workers "supervised," cajoled, and threatened. But all of these
interventions rested on an implicit threat of legal action, and
there were no programs of therapy or even counselling.
Contrary to the claims and, perhaps, beliefs of the leaders
of professional child protection, casework did not lessen the
emphasis on law enforcement in the dispensation of cases. The
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rate of prosecution of parents for neglect, leading to child removal, declined only insignificantly- from 28.3% of cases between 1880 and 1909 to 25.3% between 1944 and 1960. The
MSPCC acknowledged that at the end of the 1940s it still prosecuted in 25% of its cases (Mulford, 1983, p. 4). The rate of court
and police involvement also declined only slightly, from 83.5%
in the first period to 80% in the last, with a peak during the
period of the introduction of casework (90% during 1910-1929).
Lacking any material aid to offer, child protectors could make
referrals to relief agencies. These did increase over time, but not
sharply: 56% of clients were referred to one or another public
agency before 1929, 71% during the Depression, declining to
64% after 1944. Child protectors sometimes advocated for their
clients with other agencies, and often succeeded in getting benefits for them. Nevertheless, the referral process, because of the
fragmentation of social service responsibilities, was often experienced by clients not as help but as a run-around, the "agency
waltz." Moreover, the casework approach led to an emphasis on
supervision, so that when relief was offered it came with many
strings for clients, and felt more instrusive. Behind the "supervision" lay the implied threat of prosecution or child removal.
Family violence case workers were systematically limited by
other agencies' restrictions on relief. For example, for most of
this period clients could get no relief until they had proven that
there were no family members available to provide support.
This, of course, induced clients to hide their social networks,
and sometimes stimulated relatives to withdraw from involvement with clients. This in turn deprived violent families of
needed emotional and social support. Case workers, influenced
by norms of family independence, were generally uninterested
in, sometimes even hostile to, the kinds of support friends and
neighbors could offer. MSPCC agents typically reacted negatively to visiting between friends or neighbors, particularly
women, perceiving this activity as lazy, self-centered, purposeless, or motivated by noseyness. The casework approach continued moralistic, using aid as a reward for good behavior.
Case workers sometimes sought improved housing for their
clients. But because they were trained to treat families as autonomous units, they evaluated living conditions without regard
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to the social networks around them. Family case workers frequently pressured families to move to "better" neighborhoods,
either to upgrade their apartment or to remove their children
from bad influences, without recognizing the value of the suppport of friends and/or kin nearby in the old neighborhood. For
example, in 1960 a recently arrived Puerto Rican family, consisting of a mother, five children and two cousins, lived in a
basement apartment with two bedrooms, and the MSPCC worker
(also a Puerto Rican, it is worth noting) pressured them to move.
The clients resisted leaving their solidly Puerto Rican neighborhood, near to many friends and some relatives, a Puerto Rican
Catholic church, a Puerto Rican Club, and a settlement house
with special programs for Puerto Rican children (Gordon, 1988,
case code #6087).
The norm of family independence also led many family violence case workers, all employed by private charities, to oppose
the entry of public agencies into child welfare. Child protectors
opposed state mothers' pensions, for example, although the impoverishment of single mothers was in itself a major cause of
child neglect. Their opposition partly reflected jurisdictional rivalry and fears that the use of tax money would dry up their
own sources of support, but also hostility to public aid in general and single-mother families in particular (Gordon, 1985).
Case workers' repertoire of ways to help were also limited
by the policy of promoting "proper" gender relations in the family. Despite the relatively high incidence of wife beating in the
case records-22% 9-child protection workers often resisted
strategies that would help women gain independence: divorce,
day nurseries, and employment for example. Although divorce
lost some of its stigma of immorality, case workers considered
it bad for children through the 1960s (Gordon, 1985 and 1988).
Child protectors considered it their responsibility to work towards reconciliation of spouses. Yet in many cases of marital
violence, child abuse, incest, and child neglect, helping mothers
to leave their husbands would clearly have been best not only
for the women but for the children; the only alternatives were
futile attempts to "reform" the male culprit. In 1943 one mother,
who had left her abusive husband, survived with the makeshift
child care arrangements typical of many "neglectful" single
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mothers: she worked at a cafe from 4 p.m. to 3 a.m., a babysitter
stayed with her three children until 11 p.m., and then they were
left alone. The MSPCC worker, instead of helping her find better
babysitting or another job, reminded her that "Mo's place is at
home" (Gordon, 1988, case code #4800). Even when case workers perceived that women's employment was their only option,
they often interpreted problems in such a way as to increase
women's guilt and anxiety. In 1950-52 a married woman with
an alcoholic husband worked nights (in addition to doing all the
housework), getting only three to four hours of sleep a night,
to supplement his irregular earnings. The MSPCC agent blamed
the misbehavior of the couple's two daughters on her employment, but offered no other support for her nor help in leaving
the marriage (Gordon, 1988, case code #5782).
The casework approach continued the assumption that
women should bear the primary, often exclusive, responsibility
for children's welfare. In the child neglect cases-which in this
historical study as in contemporary caseloads represent the majority of all family violence cases-women were by definition
the culprits, even when there were fathers present. In a recent
survey conducted by David Gil, one of the neglect categories
was malnourishment. In 100% of the cases in which a father
and a mother were both present, the mother was labelled the
perpetrator (Light, 1973). Even in cases where fathers had attacked children, physically or sexually, a search for the responsibility of the mother was a common practice (Gordon, 1986).
The pattern of blaming women's "nagging" for men's violence
has been well documented. The casework approach encouraged,
or at least justified, this deflection of responsibility by its insistence on examining the whole family picture, rather than focusing on a specific crime.
Psychology
New developments in psychology in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries affected the language and categories of
child protectors, as of all social workers. Historians have primarily focused on the impact of Freudianism (Davoren, 1982;
Briar and Miller, 1971, p. 9; Field, 1980). In casework, however,
the first massive influence of the new psychology came through
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the measurement of intelligence and psychic pathologies. These
categories were adopted by child protectors to explain abuse. In
the Progressive era child-protection agencies began to use the
psychological testing and diagnostic services of child guidance
centers (Orme and Stuart, 1981). For example, in Boston the
Judge-Baker Guidance Center, a national leader among these
clinics, was consulted about many MSPCC cases.
Despite the adoption of new diagnostic labels, child protectors did not in fact apply psychotherapy to family violence problems. In this study, there was less than a 4% increase in agency
provision of medical or mental health treatment for family violence from 1880 to 1960. There was a substantial increase in
committments to mental institutions-from 27% between 1910
to 1929, to 35% between 1930 and 1943, to 37.5% after 1944.
These committments were virtually all to public institutions, at
which little that could be called treatment was offered; they are
more accurately considered along with other forms of
incarceration.
Even within the area of diagnostics, shifting labels should
not in themselves be taken as evidence of substantive change,
for there was a great deal of underlying continuity. In order to
evaluate this we must review its history, returning briefly to the
beginning of our time period. Psychological diagnoses of family
violence passed through four major stages: the concepts of depravity and degeneracy; the identification of forms of mental
retardation; psychoanalysis and the focus on sexual repression
and conflict; and, most recently, psychological parenting theory.
In the late nineteenth century, child protectors identified
psychological defects which were hereditary, or at least congenital and permanent, notably depravity and degeneracy. These
were group, not individual, categories, as much moral as descriptive, often correlating visible physical attributes with moral
capabilities, and often inextricable from class assumptions about
the inferiority of the poor. These diagnoses often referred to
"types," considering individuals as representatives of (ethnic
and religious) groups: "she is a typical low-grade Italian (Gordon, 1988, case code #2059A). Clients were labelled shiftless,
worthless, "ignorant type," uncouth, coarse, "low type," and
particularly often, "of weak character (Gordon, 1988). 10 In fact,
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these categories were used well into the twentieth century, after
the supposed adoption of secular and environmentalist values
by agencies. A quantification of all the racial, religious and class
slurs used by caseworkers to label clients in this study revealed
no decrease in Progresive era, not even among the professional
clinicians at the Judge Baker Guidance Center and Boston Psychopathic Hospital (Gordon, 1988, chapter 3; Lundbeck, 7).
There is a particular history of the psychological diagnoses
of alcohol abuse, always highly correlated with family violence,
which forms a microcosm of the approach to family violence. In
the late nineteenth century, drinking was conceived more as a
social than an individual problem; like "depravity" it was a characteristic of inferior groups. Moralism about drinking, however,
increased towards the end of the century, and the child protectors began to view it as willful defiance. Thus an 1888 diagnosis:
The drunkard is a criminal, because he wilfully, by his inebriation,
destroys that institution which, as we have said, lies at the basis
of the civil and social order. The inebriate, then, by his wilfull
persistence in drunkenness, makes himself a criminal, and unfitted to care for the morals of his children; and, therefore, the general
conclusion . . . is that the children must be taken from drunken
parents (NCCC, 1888, 133).
At the turn of the century, alcoholism came to be regarded fully
as an individual vice, product of a personality problem widely
known as "weak character," to be combatted by moral exhortation and environmental improvement. Half a century later, alcoholism was medicalized, understood as a physiological
addiction and illness. The theoretical difference was great: from
a symptom of fundamental inferiority to a personal weakness
to an illness of indeterminate occurrence, implying in theory no
original fault in its victim.
Had this medical diagnosis led to better remedies for alcoholism, it would have been beneficial. However, the historical
evidence suggests otherwise. Alcoholism in general and alcoholrelated family violence was reduced. Average per capita consumption of spirits declined more than 50% during the nineteenth century. In this study, drunken violence constituted 87%
of cases in 1880, 60% in 1960. But social work intervention was
not responsible for this change; rather general improvements in
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diet, housing, and other aspects of the standard of living, combined with women's increased economic power (lessening their
and their children's dependence on male wages) reduced liquor
consumption and the numbers of children living with alcoholic
parents (Lender and Martin, 1982).
In the early twentieth century child protectors began using
individualized categories of mental deficiency to explain improper parenting. There was, however, a substantial gap between professional psychological categories and their use by
family violence case workers. By the turn of the century, many
US textbooks on "amentia," as mental deficiency was called by
its scholars, were delineating specific types of mental retardation
(Barr, 1904, chapter III), and in 1906 Henry Goddard introduced
calibrated "intelligence" testing into the US. In the family violence agency case records, however, the use of the catch-all category, feeble-mindedness, increased after 1910. As late as the
1940s, and in the records of the most professionally vanguard of
the agencies, Judge Baker, clinicians continued to use the older,
unrefined and untested categories of mental ability: "low mentality," "low-grade individual," "ignorant type." These subjective
labels coexisted with supposedly "objective" testing. Like most
testing agencies in the early twentieth century, Judge Baker clinicians administered profoundly culturally biased tests. Immigrant children were offered such test items as:
The are often more contented the rich.
To eat
one is ------is a ----pleasure.
What holiday comes in December?
What people were in America when the white men came? (Gordon,
1988, case code #7027.)
The class content of their categories-in the use of terms like
"common" or "refined"-was common as late as the 1930s; so
was equivocation between categories of intelligence and morality, even criminality, as in "moral imbecility" as an explanation
for child abuse.
Categories of cognitive ability presumably described biological capacity and thus carried no implications for treatmentrather they tended to support enforcement solutions, such as
incarceration. The psychiatric categories associated with Freud,
sexual repression and conflict, were different in that regard,
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since they promised the possibility of personality adjustment.
In fact the sexual theme reached child-welfare workers not directly from Freud's work but from William Healy, founder and
director of the Judge Baker Guidance Center in Boston, who was
distinctly not a Freudian. Reacting to the static labels derived
from testing, Healy focussed on conflicts in individual mental
life as the source of trouble and the key to treatment (Healy,
1918, pp. 22-31).
The clinic therapists' emphasis on inner conflict correlated
with disapproval of corporal punishment as a primary disciplinary technique. (The view that children obey out of fear of pain
stems from a linear, not a conflict, model of learning.) Parents
were counselled not to rely on beatings for discipline." These
admonitions to gentler methods, however, did not themselves
rest on a conflict model of learning because they remained mere
recommendations; clinics like Judge Baker did not offer longterm therapy or counselling. Nor did family violence clients get
referrals elsewhere-rates of psychiatric referrals moved only
12
from 17% during 1915-1930 to 18.5% thereafter.
Recently a post-Freudian psychoanalytic school of thought,
object relations theory, influenced child protection discussion
and particularly custody decisions. Focusing on early infant attachments, the emphasis on "psychological parenting" prioritizes continuous and exclusive mother-child relations, beginning
soon after birth, and suggests that multiple and shifting relationships can weaken ego development. Some child development experts have argued that absence of early mother-child
bonding may explain and even predict child abuse. What is
relevant here is that object-relations theory has been used to
provide yet another argument for the normative sexual division
of labor, particularly for women's exclusive responsibility for
parenting. The theory has also been invoked to insist on family
independence and delegitimize nonnuclear family child raising
(Arney, 1980; Breines and Gordon, 1983; Gordon, 1984).
Leaving aside these criticisms of the various psychoanalytic
theories-Freudian and object relations-we return to the question, what difference did they make in practice? No therapeutic
programs were developed to compensate for the neurotic patterns thus identified. Worse, the theories themselves may have

Family Violence

served to block other forms of help, by locating the problems
exclusively in intrapsychic patterns and by stipulating as healthy
only patterns in which women played conventional mothering
roles.
Sources of Future Progress
Little progress in the treatment of family violence by social
work agencies occurred between 1880 and 1960, despite drastic
shifts in theory and rhetoric. Although social workers have been
frequently scapegoated for these failures, in fact the shortcomings of individual case workers were the smallest part of the
problem. Indeed, the case records suggest that individual social
workers contributed more, on average, than the official policy
of the agencies they represented. Many family violence clients
were helped because case workers exceeded their job description, acting in the original spirit of casework, understanding
that family violence problems emerge from a combination of
social-structural, intrapsychic, and relational stresses, and resisting the tendency towards fragmentation in modem social services. They faced a variety of obstacles, inadequate funding and
oversized case loads prominent among them. It is important that
the stinginess of the social service system derives from the norms
discussed above, expecting families to be economically independent and women to bear the sole responsibility for childraising, expecting case workers' roles to be confined to emergency intervention to shore up male-dominated nuclear families.
There was, however, one exception to this bleak picture:
there was distinct progress in the situation of battered women.
Despite the fact that there were no agencies devoted to the problem of wife-beating, and that the child protective agencies attempted to exclude it from their jurisdictions, battered women
in fact succeeded in getting more help from the agencies than
did abused children. Battered women grew steadily more vociferous in complaining over time, in demanding support for
leaving abusive men, and in persuading case workers to support
them in obtaining separations, divorces, and independent
households. By contrast, children's levels of complaints did not
change over time. (This is not because children did not seek out
agency help; on the contrary they frequently complained to out-
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siders about parental treatment, but no more so recently than
in the early years of this study.) Women's greater assertiveness
did not arise because they hated being beaten more than they
had previously; the evidence from the earlier years suggests that
they resisted it in every possible way except the one most effective way-leaving the abuser. Turning to that remedy resulted
from their greater chances for economic independence, a gain
not felt by children. Obviously young children are not capable
of independence; the comparable solutions for abused children
would have been either support for female-headed households
where men were the abusers, or good quality alternative placements where there was no adequate parent.
Three factors can be identified as particularly influential in
improving women's capacity for escape from abuse: aid to single
mothers (state mothers' pensions from about 1910, federal AFDC
after 1936); increased women's employment; and the influence
of the women's-rights movement. Increased employment for
women was of course mainly a product of industrial development, but the campaign against child labor contributed, and
feminist activism was influential in both. Employment opportunities made it of course much easier for women to escape
abusive situations, as did aid to single mothers. Before such aid,
many mothers had faced the choice of remaining in abusive
marriages or losing their children to institutions; aid thus not
only helped many women to protect themselves and their children, but it also saved many children from institutionalization.
Aid to single mothers also helped children whose mother was
their abuser or neglecter, by improving her living and working
conditions. But no major reforms improved the destiny of children removed from their parents.
What is striking about these improvements for women is
that none of them came directly from social work intervention.
They came rather from social reforms, fought for in the political
arena. Some nonprofessional charity workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been part of the reform
coalition, but by the Progressive era most social workers were
opposed to these reforms. By contrast the kinds of reforms that
might have benefitted child abuse victims-well paid foster care,
for example-did not happen.
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When clients did benefit from their contact with social work
agencies, it was mainly because of their own activism in pressuring case workers. Because child protection work has been
oriented to law enforcement did not mean that its typical clients
were resistant to outside intervention. On the contrary, the Jones
case, in which both victims and assailants asked for help, was
representative. Moreover, once on the case load, clients actively
pursued their own goals in negotiations and struggles with case
workers. Their own standards and aspirations for family life
shaped their demands as well as their ability to take help when
it was offered (Gordon, 1986).
Social work did contribute importantly to solving family violence problems, but indirectly: case workers often helped raise
women's and children's consciousness of having rights. But they
rarely did so as a result of professional theories about family
conflict. Rather social work counselling often reinforced clients'
sense of outrage and helped them feel entitled through advocating for them with other agencies. Above all, the best case
workers learned from some clients how to help others. Social
workers with sensitive "ears" have served as a vital conduit
through which those at the bottom of society, with little political
or social influence, could nevertheless make their needs known,
and forcefully. Mothers' pensions was one reform that was stimulated from that bottom-up process of communication (Gordon,
1985).
This is not to suggest that the social workers' virtues were
instinctive. Their counselling and listening skills were the result
of training, experience, and some of the best of social work
theory about the complex art of helping. Still, the record suggests that only in combination with material resources and social
reform could social work help prevent family violence. This does
not mean that material aid alone can stop family violence. It
bears repeating here that poverty, unemployment, and "stress"whatever that abstraction means-do not in themselves cause
family violence; most people suffering from those problems are
not violent or neglectful. I am arguing rather for the necessity
of maintaining an approach to family violence that consolidates
the psychological and material, the personal and social. Without
a larger public demand for more spending on social services,
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not only to violent families but, on a preventive basis, to all,
there is reason to question the value of social work and social
science research about the etiology and treatment of family
violence.
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Footnotes
1. The study randomly sampled records from the MSPCC, the Boston Children's Service Association (BCSA), and the Judge Baker Guidance Center
(JBGC). Five hundred and two cases were coded and analyzed, and several thousand read. The findings and research methodology appear in
Gordon, 1988.
2. I do not mean to imply that the case records represent an "objective"
source. I have spelled out elsewhere some of the problems of bias in such
records. see Gordon, 1988, Appendix A.
3. These intelligence tests were hopelessly biased against those without
education. Moreover, children so deprived of good nutrition and health
were frequently backward in cognitive as well as physical development.
4. Although women were equally often child abusers, men were more often
prosecuted for two reasons: first, because many men were prosecuted
for wife beating; second, because case workers knew that the threat of
removing children was not sufficient to strike fear into them, while it
worked well with women.
5. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Governors' Papers, Pardons Granted,
Box 17 #67.
6. This is partly because Progressive-era professionals exaggerated how bad
the nineteenth amateur child protectors had been. Their law-enforcement
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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

approach did not blind them to environmental influences; their list of
causes of family violence was not so different from that which results
from contemporary research: poverty, alcohol abuse, unemployment,
overcrowding, illness, isolation.
Some critiques of the "medical model" have associated it with the involvement of physicians in defining and reporting child abuse from the
1960s, and with the diagnosis of the newly rediscovered child abuse in
terms of psychopathological parents, by Kempe, Steele, and Pollack, for
example (Gelles, 1973; Breines and Gordon, 1983). I am arguing here, in
contrast, that the medical model began much earlier, in the Progressive
era with the first development of case work.
In the nineteenth century, when social work was not professionalized,
child protectors felt less restricted as to what they could offer clients.
Agents offered gifts of clothing, taught sewing and "American" styles of
cooking, took children on outings, for examples.
Clearly an underestimate since (a) the agencies were only supposed to
protect children, not women, and (b) the figure includes only those cases
in which an agency worker took enough cognizance of a woman's complaints to include them in the case record.
The last was particularly important to the understanding of family violence, revealing as it does the Protestant image of a divided psyche, an
existence beset by temptation, with virtue characterized above all by the
ability to say no to impulses.
Indeed, the Judge Baker approach, and perhaps the whole therapeutic
approach to problems with children, accelerated a parent-blaming trend
in dealing with delinquency. Previous to the nineteenth century selfconsciousness about child raising, popular psychology assumed no particular connection between parental methods and how children "turned
out." By contrast, the poor parents in this study did not characteristically,
even as late as the 1960s, accept responsibility for the bad behavior of
their children.
In the 1940s, MSPCC director Robert M. Mulford claimed, psychiatric
consultation became standard procedure for his agency (Mulford, 1983, 4).
This claim was not borne out by our analysis of the case records.

